Introduction
Numerous academic studies have investigated relationships between health insurance status and a wide variety of outcomes such as health care utilization, health status, labor supply, and participation in public assistance programs. In more than 70 articles surveyed by Gruber and Madrian (2004) , Levy and Meltzer (2004) , and Buchmueller et al. (2005) , nearly all parameters of interest are identi…ed using a variety of parametric approaches. 1 We develop the …rst nonparametric framework for studying the potential impact of universal health insurance on the nation's use of medical services. Within this framework, we study relationships between insurance status and use of services (expenditures and number of provider visits) in an environment of uncertainty about both counterfactual utilization outcomes and status quo insurance status. Our empirical work exploits detailed data in the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). To aid in identi…cation, we construct health insurance validation data for a nonrandom portion of the sample based on insurance cards, policy booklets, and follow-back interviews with employers and insurance companies.
Motivated by limitations inherent in self-reported insurance data, our analysis extends the nonparametric literature on partially identi…ed probability distributions in several dimensions. First, we provide sharp bounds on the conditional mean of a continuous or discrete random variable (in our case health care utilization) for the case that a binary conditioning variable (insurance status) is subject to arbitrary endogenous classi…cation error. In this environment, insurance reporting errors may be arbitrarily related to true insurance status and health care use. Second, we formally assess how statistical identi…cation of a treatment e¤ect decays with the degree of uncertainty about the status quo. Our approach extends the nonparametric treatment e¤ect literature for the case that some treatments are unobserved (especially Molinari, 2005) . 2 Third, we relax the nondi¤erential independence assumption -evaluated by Bollinger (1996) and Bound et al. (2001) -embedded in the classical errors-in-variables model. As an alternative, we evaluate the identifying power of a weaker monotonicity assumption that misreporting of insurance status does not rise with the 1 An exception is the study by Olson (1998) who uses semiparametric techniques to estimate the relationship between women's labor hours and the availability of health insurance through a spouse. 2 To isolate identi…cation problems associated with partially unobserved insurance status as a conditioning variable or treatment, we assume that other variables in the analysis are measured without error. level of utilization. Given the di¢ culty in identifying plausible instruments in our application, we consider what can be identi…ed in the absence of instruments. 3 Evidence from validation studies, which compare survey data with administrative data or followback interviews with insurers or employers, suggests that surveys of health insurance contain classi…cation errors. Error rates vary across surveys and may arise in part from di¢ culty recalling duration of coverage and di¢ culty reporting the status of other family members. Using matched surveys of employers and their employees, for example, Berger et al. (1998) …nd that 21% of the workers and their employers disagree about whether the worker was eligible for insurance. Their study appears to represent the only prior analysis of potentially mismeasured insurance status in an econometric framework. Assuming exogenous measurement error in a classical errors-in-variables setting (accounting for the binary nature of the mismeasured variable), they …nd that even nonsystematic reporting error seriously biases their estimated e¤ect of insurance eligibility on wage growth.
In the only study to examine all sources of insurance, Nelson et al. (2000) conducted in-person interviews with 351 reportedly insured adults using the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey and interviews with insurers. They do not …nd evidence of large-scale misreporting of current insurance status itself, but they …nd large inconsistencies in reported source of coverage and duration of coverage. 4 In other studies, estimated error rates vary across surveys for both In all validation studies, the level of misreporting in cases that could not be veri…ed is unknown and may be higher than among those who cooperated with the study. Nelson et al. (2000) , for example, excluded adults who did not complete permission forms to contact insurers. 5 Furthermore, 3 Using methods in Lewbel (2004) , the treatment e¤ects could be point-identi…ed in certain cases if we had instruments that a¤ect insurance status but not classi…cation error or the average treatment e¤ect. For related work on potentially endogenous classi…cation errors in a linear regression framework, see Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) . 4 For example, when an insurer said an adult was insured for a year or less, the adult's report agreed only 40% of the time. 5 The presence of reporting errors compromise a researcher's ability to make reliable inferences about the status quo, and they further confound identi…cation of counterfactual outcomes associated with policies that would alter the distribution of insurance coverage within the population, such as national health insurance. 6 The Census Bureau now issues caveats about the accuracy of "Until we can make progress in separating the measurement error from the reality of uninsurance, our policy solutions will continue to be ine¢ cient, and our ability to measure our successes will continue to be limited."
Our analysis does not presume the existence of large-scale insurance classi…cation error in any particular dataset. In fact, we …nd no evidence of large-scale error in the MEPS. Instead, we formalize important identi…cation problems associated with even small degrees of potential error.
The next section discusses the MEPS data and our health insurance veri…cation strategy. Section 3 formalizes the statistical identi…cation problem associated with estimating the gap in service use between the insured and uninsured under existing policies when insurance status is subject to arbitrary patterns of classi…cation error. We derive bounds on the unknown utilization gap under alternative assumptions about the nature and degree of reporting errors. We weaken the strict nondi¤erential independence assumption embodied in the classical errors-in-variables framework to allow for the possibility that using health services may inform a patient of her true insurance status.
Section 4 investigates what can be learned about the impact of national health insurance on the use of health services. We show how common monotonicity assumptions, such as monotone treatment response (MTR) and monotone treatment selection (MTS), can be combined to substantially reduce uncertainty about the size of the policy e¤ect. Under an additional monotone instrumental study found that in 2000, 30 percent of MediCal enrollment records lacked valid Social Security Numbers (Killion 2005). Hence, estimates based on surveys matched to MediCal records may not be representative of the MediCal population. 6 The extent to which universal coverage would increase use of services and expenditures has been estimated in a variety of parametric studies (Institute of Medicine 2003). Estimates of incremental spending range from $34 to $69 billion per year depending on the statistical assumptions and choice of comparison groups. variable assumption that exploits information on age and health status combined with a natural monotone restriction on the pattern of classi…cation errors, we can provide tight bounds on the impact of universal coverage without relying on some of the more controversial assumptions involving functional forms and independence. Section 5 concludes.
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
The data come from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally representative household survey conducted by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. In the MEPS Household Component (MEPS HC), each family (reporting unit) was interviewed …ve times over two and a half years to obtain annual data re ‡ecting a two year reference period (Cohen 1997 ). This paper focuses on the nonelderly population because almost all adults become eligible for Medicare at age 65. The sample contains 18,851 individuals.
We study insurance and service use in July 1996. We focus on July because the 1996 MEPS has a follow-back survey of employers, unions, and insurance companies which reported insurance information as of July 1, 1996 . We use 1996 data because that is the only year for which respondents to the follow-back survey reported on the employees'and policyholders'insurance status rather than whether the establishment o¤ered insurance. 7 Studying insurance and service use in one month also reduces the likelihood of confounding the dynamics of insurance status with misreported insurance status because employment-related insurance typically covers an entire month.
Insurance Status Reported in the Household Component
The MEPS HC asks about insurance from a comprehensive list of all possible sources of insurance.
In the …rst interview, conducted between March and August 1996, MEPS HC asked the family respondent about insurance held at any time since January 1st. Because employment-related insurance is the most prevalent source of insurance, the family respondent was asked about all jobs held by coresiding family members since January 1st, jobs family members had retired from, and the last job held. The family respondent was asked whether the employee had insurance from each job. Then the family respondent was asked whether anyone had: Medicare Medicaid 7 These data are available at the AHRQ Data Center.
Champus/Champva
For those who did not report Medicaid, any other type of health insurance through any state or local government agency which provided hospital and physician bene…ts Health bene…ts from other state programs or other public programs providing coverage for health care services 8 Other sources of private insurance, such as from a group or association, insurance company, previous employer, or union.
For each source of insurance, MEPS HC asked which family members were covered and when. 9 In the second interview, conducted between August and December 1996, MEPS HC asked questions based on jobs and insurance reported to be held at the time of the …rst interview to determine whether previously reported insurance was still held or when it ended. MEPS also asked about new jobs and insurance from those jobs, public insurance acquired since the …rst interview, and insurance acquired from other sources since the …rst interview. The recall period is not especially long, typically four to seven months. Responses to the questions from the …rst and second interview were used to construct indicators of insurance coverage at any time during July 1996 and uninsurance, the residual category. Family respondents reported 80:7% of the nonelderly population were insured in July 1996 and 19:3% were uninsured (Table 1 ).
Service Use and Expenditures
In each interview, the MEPS asks about health care services used by all coresiding family members since the last interview. The MEPS also obtains permission to interview a sample of the medical providers identi…ed in the Household Component surveys to supplement household-reported health care expenditure and source of payment information. We create measures of service use and expenditures in July 1996: number of provider visits for ambulatory medical care (a medical provider visit, hospital outpatient visit, or emergency room visit), an indicator for whether the sample person had a hospital stay or ambulatory services, and expenditures for hospital stays and ambulatory 8 A very small number of individuals are reportedly covered through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and these are counted as Medicaid. Other sources, such as the Veterans Administration and the Indian Health Services, are not included in measures of hospital/physician insurance. 9 State-speci…c program names are used in the questions. Single-service and dread disease plans are not included in measures of hospital/physician insurance. Insurance status is not imputed to families with missing data, which are rare.
services. Twenty-one percent of the (weighted) sample used medical care in that month. 10 Persons who the family respondent said were insured in July were nearly 80% more likely to have used medical care (22:5% of the insured versus 12:7% of the uninsured, Table 1 ). The mean number of provider visits is also much greater for the reportedly insured, as are mean expenditures.
Veri…cation Data
We use detailed data to identify sample members for whom there is evidence corroborating their insurance status. The 1996 MEPS includes three sources that can be used to con…rm health insurance reported by families: (1) the HC interviewers ask respondents to show insurance cards, (2) the HC interviewers ask respondents to provide policy booklets, and (3) separate interviews were conducted with family members' employers and insurance companies. Respondents for the family, employers, or insurance companies could err in reporting a person's insurance status; none provides a gold standard of information. Nonetheless, we use con…rmations of insurance status to formally verify the insurance status of some sample members. This approach represents a compromise between taking reported insurance status at face value for all sample members and discarding valuable family respondents'reports about insurance status.
We label sample members as veri…ed insured if an insurance card was shown at the time of the interview, a policy booklet was given to the interviewer, or if an employer or insurance company con…rmed that the person was covered by insurance. We assume that a report that a sample member is uninsured is accurate as long as there is no contradictory information from any family member's employers and all employers provided data. The person's insurance status was not veri…ed (but not assumed to be incorrect) if there were insu¢ cient veri…cation data or if employers or insurance companies contradicted the family respondent. Details are provided in a detailed data appendix available upon request.
As shown in Table 1 , we …nd that 80:2% of the reportedly insured were con…rmed as insured by a card, policy booklet, or an establishment. For the few cases in which a respondent produced an insurance card but the establishment reported that the person was uninsured, we treat these cases as veri…ed insured based on the physical evidence of insurance. Among the reportedly uninsured, 11:7% are veri…ed (Table 1 ). This relatively low number re ‡ects the lack of an employed family member in some uninsured families and the lack of response by some employers. Recall that uninsurance is veri…ed under this strategy only if all of the family's employers responded and con…rmed that they did not provide insurance to the sample member. Overall, 67:0% of the sample was veri…ed.
The Identi…cation Problem
To evaluate the impact of inaccurate insurance classi…cations, we introduce notation that distinguishes between classi…ed insurance status and actual insurance status. In this section, we focus on identi…cation issues at the population level; when presenting empirical estimates, we also consider the uncertainty created by sampling variability. Let I = 1 indicate that a person is truly insured, with I = 0 otherwise. We observe the self-reported counterpart I. A latent variable Z indicates whether a report is accurate. If I and I coincide, then Z = 1; otherwise, Z = 0. Let Y = 1 indicate that I is veri…ed to be accurate (i.e., Z is known to equal 1). If Y = 0, then Z may be either 1 or 0. 11 In no case is the value of Z assumed to be 0. 12 Let U denote the amount of health care services consumed during the reference period. Typically, the amount of care is measured as health expenditures or number of provider visits. Policymakers are also interested in the proportion of the population that uses any medical care, in which case U can be treated as a binary variable. In this section, we investigate what can be learned about the utilization gap between the insured and uninsured,
when true insurance status, I , is unobserved for part of the sample. 13 In Section 4, we focus on the impact of universal coverage.
The utilization gap is not identi…ed since we observe E(U jI) but not E(U jI ). Our objective is to provide worst-case bounds on . To partially identify E(U jI ), we will …rst derive bounds on the 1 1 In their analysis of testing for environmental pollutants, Dominitz and Sherman (2004) were the …rst to formalize the idea of distinguishing between "veri…ed" and "unveri…ed" observations in the data. 1 2 That is, we conservatively allow for the possibility that the MEPS insurance classi…cation is accurate even if the classi…cation is not con…rmed by a card, booklet, employer, or insurance company. 1 3 Our notation leaves implicit any other covariates of interest. We focus on bounding the utilization gap for the nonelderly population as a whole, but it is straightforward to condition on subpopulations of interest. Note that we are not estimating a regression, and there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be satis…ed.
fraction of the population that consumes no more than a particular amount of care conditional on unobserved insurance status, P (U tjI ). We can then provide bounds on E(U jI ) by integrating over these worst-case probabilities.
Using Bayes'rule, we can write
Neither the numerator nor the denominator are identi…ed, but assumptions on the pattern of classi…cation errors can place restrictions on relationships between the unobserved quantities. Let + t P (U t; I = 1; Z = 0) and t P (U t; I = 0; Z = 0) denote the fraction of false positive and false negative insurance classi…cations, respectively, among those whose medical consumption did not exceed t. Let 0+ t P (U > t; I = 1; Z = 0) and 0 t P (U > t; I = 0; Z = 0) denote the analogous fractions among those whose use of care exceeded t. We can then decompose the numerator and denominator in (2) into identi…ed and unidenti…ed quantities:
where P (U t; I = 1) and P (I = 1) are identi…ed by the data. In the numerator, t + t re ‡ects the unobserved excess of false negative vs. false positive insurance classi…cations among those whose use of services did not exceed t. In the denominator, t + 0 t
re ‡ects the unobserved excess of false positive vs. false negative insurance classi…cations within the entire population. Utilization among the uninsured, P (U tjI = 0), can be decomposed in a similar fashion.
We now assess what can be learned about under various sets of assumptions. First, we derive "arbitrary error" bounds that impose no structure on the distribution of false positives and false negatives. We next examine the identifying power of two common independence assumptions.
Because these independence assumptions may not be plausible in our application, we introduce weaker variants of these assumptions.
Arbitrary error bounds
Following Horowitz and Manski (1995) and the literature on robust statistics (e.g., Huber 1981),
we can study how identi…cation of an unknown parameter varies with the con…dence in the data.
Consider a lower bound on the fraction of accurate classi…cations among unveri…ed cases: identi…cation can be studied for the case that v is set to 0. At any rate, we can assess the sensitivity of conclusions to the degree of con…dence in the data.
We begin by logically determining the lowest feasible value of P (U tjI = 1). Di¤erentiating the right hand side of (3), we …nd that this quantity is increasing in 0+ t , the unobserved fraction of individuals with U > t misclassi…ed as being insured, and in t , the unobserved fraction of individuals with U t misclassi…ed as being uninsured. As a worst-case possibility for the lower bound, we must therefore set 0+ t = t = 0 to obtain: nor can it exceed the total fraction of misclassi…ed cases:
To …nd the lower bound of P (U tjI = 1), we must …nd the minimum feasible value for the right-hand side (5). Therefore, for any candidate value of + t , we need 0 t to attain its maximum allowed value conditional on
The objective then becomes one of minimizing P (U t; I = 1)
over feasible values of 
When this quantity is negative, we must raise + t to its maximum feasible value, + t ; otherwise, we
Similar logic provides an upper bound on P (U 1jI = 1). After de…ning
, the preceding results establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let P (Z = 1jY = 0) v, and suppose that nothing is known about the pattern of false positive and false negative reporting errors. Then the mean utilization rate among the truly insured is bounded sharply as follows:
. and values
Analogous bounds for the utilization rate among the uninsured, E(U jI = 0), are obtained by replacing I = 1 with I = 0 and vice versa. Notice that increasing v narrows the bounds over some ranges of v but not others, and the rate of identi…cation decay can be highly nonlinear as v declines.
Kreider and Pepper's (2005) Proposition 2 bounds apply as a special case when the outcome U is binary and v = 0. 14 We next turn to our …rst set of empirical results. We compute a lower bound on the utilization gap, , by subtracting the upper bound on E(U jI = 0) from the lower bound on E(U jI = 1).
Similarly, we compute an upper bound by subtracting the lower bound on E(U jI = 0) from the upper bound on E(U jI = 1).
Arbitrary error results
Figures 1(a)-(c) trace out estimated bounds on the utilization gap, , as a function of v for any use of services, number of provider visits, and expenditures, respectively. Following much of the classi…cation error literature, we focus on cases in which at least half the unveri…ed classi…cations are assumed to be accurate. 15 The widest sets of bounds in the …gures correspond to the Proposition 1 bounds. For all sets of bounds, the …gures depict the 5th percentile lower bound and 95th percentile upper bound. 16 When v = 1, is point-identi…ed as the self-reported gap, P (U = 1jI = 1) P (U = 1jI = 0) = 0:098. Accounting for sampling variability, the gap lies within [0:086; 0:110]. The point estimates 1 4 They study how labor force participation varies with disability status given a lack of knowledge of any particular respondent's true disability status. Our Proposition 1 extends their methodology by considering continuous outcomes and by assessing identi…cation for values of v greater than 0 within unveri…ed classi…cations. Their analysis does not impose our assumption that all veri…ed cases are accurate. 1 5 That is, the data are more informative than their converse (see, e.g., Bollinger (1996) , and Frazis and Loewenstein (2003)). 1 6 We account for sampling variability using balanced repeated replication methods that account for the complex survey design (Wolter, 1985) . Taken at face value (re ‡ecting the values in Table 1 ), the data indicate that the insured consumed substantially more health services than the uninsured. In the absence of additional assumptions, however, we see in the …gures that identi…cation of decays rapidly as v departs from 1. The lower bounds on are particularly sensitive to the value of v. Indeed, classi…cation error rates as low as 1 to 2% are su¢ cient to create uncertainty about whether expenditures and provider visits are truly higher among the insured than among the uninsured (Figures 1b, c) . 17 Without stronger assumptions on the distribution of classi…cation errors, we cannot be con…dent that the insured consume more health services than the uninsured unless virtually all classi…cations are known to be accurate. This represents an important negative result: being almost fully con…dent in the accuracy of the data is not enough, by itself, to be informative about even the sign of the utilization gap between the insured and uninsured.
Independence assumptions
The parameter bounds thus far have allowed for arbitrary patterns of insurance classi…cation errors, including the possibility that reporting errors are endogenously related to true insurance status or the health care utilization outcome. In contrast, most economic research presumes that measurement error is exogenous to the extent that it exists at all. In this section, we make transparent the identifying power of two common (nonnested) independence assumptions that tighten the Proposition 1 bounds. Then we introduce a weaker alternative assumption that is more plausible in our context.
First, a researcher might consider a "contaminated sampling" assumption that insurance clas- 1 7 The discrete changes in slopes at some values of v are most easily understood by considering the binary case in Figure 1a . As a worst case lower bound on P (U = 1jI = 1), we must make the unknown false positive quantity a = P (U = 1; X = 1; Z = 0) among health care users as large as possible and then make the unknown false negative quantity b = P (U = 0; X = 0; Z = 0) among non-users as large as possible conditional on a. For su¢ ciently low values of v, nothing prevents a from being as large as P (U = 1; X = 1; Y = 0), the observed fraction of health care users who report health insurance coverage without veri…cation, and nothing prevents b from being as large as P (U = 0; X = 0; Y = 0), the observed fraction of non-users who report being uninsured without veri…cation. Once v exceeds 0:49, the allowed total degree of misclassi…cation is small enough that b must begin declining with v. Then once v exceeds 0:89, a must also start declining with v. Similar patterns apply to the other sets of bounds. P (I = 1jI ; U ) = P (I = 1jI ) for I = 0; 1.
Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) study this type of "nondi¤erential" classi…cation error for the case of a binary conditioning variable. When the independence assumption (9) holds, Bollinger's Theorem 1 can be used to show that is bounded below by the reported utilization gap E(U jI = 1) E(U jI = 0) (> 0) as long as the extent of insurance classi…cation errors is not too severe. 19 Re ‡ecting well-known attenuation bias associated with random measurement error, the magnitude of the reported utilization gap represents a downward-biased estimate of the magnitude of the true utilization gap. 20 We propose a weaker alternative assumption on the pattern of reporting errors. Relaxing the nondi¤erential assumption in (9), we suppose that the probability of misreporting insurance status does not rise with the level of health care utilization:
The nondi¤erential assumption represents a special case. In the next section, we illustrate how the identifying power of this monotone "nonincreasing error rate" assumption compares with the standard nondi¤erential errors assumption. We also separately evaluate the sensitivity of the bounds to departures from the exact equality in (9).
Results under independence and partial independence
The dashed lines in Figures 1(a-c) trace out the estimated bounds under the contaminated sampling assumption in (8) . 21 Compared with the case of arbitrary errors, we …nd that the critical value As discussed above, strict nondi¤erential independence may not be plausible in the context of insurance reporting errors. As seen in Figures 1(a)-(c) and the last column of Table 2 We also investigate the sensitivity of the bounds to departures from the strict equality in (9).
In particular, we generalize the standard nondi¤erential error assumption as follows: 
Utilization under Universal Health Insurance
We now turn to inferences about health care utilization under a hypothetical policy of universal health insurance. Let U (I = 1) denote the amount of health services an individual would have used in July 1996 if insured. This outcome is observed in the data only for sample members who are veri…ed to be currently insured; it is unobserved for those veri…ed to be uninsured and for those whose insurance status is not veri…ed. We wish to learn the population's expected utilization if everyone were insured, E[U (I = 1)]. If current insurance status were randomly assigned, then the utilization among the currently insured, E(U jI = 1), would represent the best prediction of the utilization rate under universal coverage. Since I is not observed for all individuals, we could instead bound E(U jI = 1) using the methods derived in the previous sections.
Of course, the observed distribution of health insurance coverage in the population is not randomly assigned. Instead, insurance status is a¤ected by characteristics potentially related to the use of medical resources. For example, families that expect to use health services may be more likely to acquire health insurance. In that case, an observed positive association between insurance coverage and utilization re ‡ects not only the e¤ect of insurance on use of services but also the e¤ect of anticipated service use on insurance status. More generally, insurance status may depend on individual and family characteristics that also determine health care use.
In the absence of random assignment or other assumptions, the quantity E[U (I = 1)] is not identi…ed even if all insurance classi…cations are known to be accurate. Unlike identi…cation of the conditional utilization rate E(U jI = 1), identi…cation of the "treatment" outcome E[U (I = 1)]
requires knowledge about the counterfactual utilization rate of the uninsured had they instead been insured. Uncertainty about the accuracy of insurance classi…cations, the focus of the current paper, further complicates identi…cation of counterfactuals.
To bound the impact of universal coverage on utilization, we begin by using the law of total probability to decompose the projected utilization rate under universal coverage into veri…ed and unveri…ed current insurance status:
The data identify P (Y = 1) and P (Y = 0) but neither utilization term. The …rst term involving veri…ed insurance status can be written as
where P 11 P (I = 1jY = 1) denotes the status quo insured rate among veri…ed cases. All of the terms in (13) Returning to (12) and decomposing the third term involving the unveri…ed cases obtains:
where P 10 P (I = 1jY = 0) is the status quo insured rate among unveri…ed cases. None of the quantities in (14) are identi…ed. We do not know P 10 , and we cannot match health care use outcomes to insurance status when insurance status is unknown.
Implicitly assuming that v = 0, Molinari (2005) shows that we can learn something about the …rst term, E(U jI = 1; Y = 0), if the researcher has outside information restricting the range of P 10 (denoted p in her framework). 22 In her innovative analysis, she estimates the treatment e¤ect of drug use on employment when drug use is unobserved for part of the sample. As shown below, we extend her analysis in two dimensions when v > 0. First, an assumption on v translates into internally-generated restrictions on P 10 as a function of v. The identifying power of this information depends on the joint distribution of the outcome variable, the self-reported conditioning variable, and the individual's validation status. Second, an assumption on v allows us to restrict the expected utilization rate among the unveri…ably truly uninsured, E(U jI = 0; Y = 0), which in turn allows us to tighten Molinari's bounds on the expected utilization rate among the unveri…ably truly insured, E(U jI = 1; Y = 0). In the …gures that follow, Molinari's framework can be used to provide sharp bounds at the points v = 0 and v = 1. Our extension allows us to …ll in identi…cation patterns for values of v between 0 and 1.
We proceed by writing the insured rate among unveri…ed cases as a function of P (I = 1jY = 0), false positive, and false negative classi…cation rates:
P 10 = P (I = 1jY = 0) + P (I = 0; Z = 0jY = 0) P (I = 1; Z = 0jY = 0). Allowing the unidenti…ed terms to vary over their feasible ranges implies P 10 2 P 10 ; P 10 where P 10 P (I = 1jY = 0) min f1 v; P (I = 1jY = 0)g (15)
P 10 P (I = 1jY = 0) + min f1 v; P (I = 0jY = 0)g .
When v = 0, P 10 is trivially bounded within [0; 1]; at the other extreme when v = 1, P 10 = P (I = 1jY = 0).
This knowledge about the range of P 10 places restrictions on the utilization patterns of the subpopulation of unveri…ed cases. We know that the distribution of utilization outcomes among unveri…ed cases is a weighted average of the utilization levels among unveri…ed insured and uninsured cases:
For a particular value of P 10 , solving for the expected utilization rate among the unveri…ed currently insured obtains
The quantity P (U tjI = 0; Y = 0) in the right-hand-side is nontrivially bounded if and only if v > 0. In that case, we can use the methods developed in Section 3.1 to obtain Varying P (U tjI = 0; Y = 0) within the feasible range [ 1 (t); 2 (t)] in (17) reveals that
Then we can bound expected health care utilization among the unveri…ably truly insured as follows:
Applying this result to the …rst term in (14) and varying E[U (I = 1)jI = 0; Y = j] within [0; sup U ] for j = 0; 1 in (13) and (14) yields the following sharp bounds on the population's use of health services under universal health insurance: 24 Proposition 2. Given P (Z = 1jY = 0) v and a known value P 10 2 P 10 (v); P 10 (v) , the population's health care utilization rate under mandatory universal insurance coverage is bounded sharply as follows:
If P 10 is unknown, the lower and upper bounds in (20) are replaced by the in…mum and supremum, respectively, of these bounds over values of P 10 2 P 10 ; P 10 .
Molinari's (2005) Proposition 1 is similar except that her probability distributions L p and U p (in place of G L and G H ) implicitly assume that v = 0 such that nothing is known about the reliability of unveri…ed classi…cations. For that special case, the bounds in (20) collapse to Molinari's bounds after setting 1 (t) = 0 and 2 (t) = 1 in (18) given her imposed assumptions, but the proposition above allows us to assess how identi…cation decays with the degree of uncertainty about the reliability of the data.
For the binary utilization case, sup U in Proposition 2 is naturally set equal to 1. Yet there is no natural limit to the number of provider visits or dollars spent on medical services. Unless 2 4 This analysis does not account for potential increases in gross prices for health care resulting from universal coverage. Since such price increases would not increase utilization, these upper bounds on E(U jI = 1) should still apply. We also assume that insurance coverage to the uninsured would be representative of the current mix of public and private coverage available to the insured. a researcher is nevertheless willing to set an upper bound on U , it must be recognized that an informative upper bound on E [U (I = 1)] cannot be logically identi…ed under the weak conditions speci…ed in Proposition 2. For our Proposition 2 empirical results, we set sup U equal to 1:69 for number of visits and to $655 for expenditures re ‡ecting mean values among individuals who (1) perceived themselves to be in poor health at the time of the …rst interview and (2) were veri…ed to be insured. These values re ‡ect the 93rd percentile for visits and the 98th percentile for expenditures.
We do not require any assumptions on sup U for the Proposition 3 bounds or monotone instrumental variable (MIV) bounds which follow.
Monotonicity assumptions
The preceding bounds can be narrowed substantially under common monotonicity assumptions on treatment response and treatment selection. The monotone treatment response assumption (MTR) speci…es that an individual's utilization is at least as high in the insured state as in the uninsured state:
Under monotone treatment selection (MTS), expected utilization under either "treatment"(insured or uninsured) would be at least as high among those currently insured as among those currently uninsured: 25
The validity of this assumption depends on the process by which individuals have selected themselves into insured and uninsured status. This assumption is consistent with evidence from Miller et al. (2004) who …nd that while the uninsured tend to be less healthy than the privately insured, they tend to be healthier than those publicly insured (e.g., through Medicaid). The uninsured may also have unobserved characteristics, such as attitudes toward care, that make them less likely to seek care. To the extent that the uninsured are less health conscious, they may seek less preventive care and wait longer before deciding to seek treatment for an ailment. In general, those who are currently insured may have a greater propensity to use care than those who are currently unin-sured. Using data from the SIPP to estimate a parametric structural model of health care use and insurance coverage, Li and Trivedi (2004) …nd that a signi…cant part of the observed lower health care use among the uninsured can be attributed to self-selection instead of the lack of insurance. 26 When both MTR and MTS hold, we can use a result in Manski and Pepper (2000, Corollary 2.2) to obtain
The lower bound on the population's use of services under universal coverage rises to E(U ), the status quo national utilization rate in the absence of universal coverage. The upper bound falls to the status quo utilization rate among those currently insured. This result combined with the upper bound on E(U jI = 1) derived in Proposition 1 leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the MTR and MTS assumptions hold across the population and
Then the expected use of services under insurance coverage is bounded above In the empirical work that follows, we also consider the additional identifying power of the independence and nonincreasing errors assumptions considered in Section 3.3.
Universal Coverage Results
Empirical results are presented in Table 3 and the bottom frames of Figures 2(a-c) . Each set of bounds for E [U (I = 1)] is calculated with the insured rate among unveri…ed classi…cations, P 10 , allowed to lie anywhere within its logically consistent range P 10 ; P 10 .
The status quo fraction of the (nonelderly) population using health services in a month is 0:206.
For v = 1 (no classi…cation error) and no monotonicity assumptions, we estimate that the fraction of the population using health services could fall by up to 2 percentage points to 0:182 or rise by 2 6 Of course, their …nding relies in part on the types of parametric assumptions we are trying to avoid.
up to 17 percentage points to 0:374. This projected range, given by [ 12%, +82%] in percentage terms, represents the well-known classical e¤ect of a mandatory policy given uncertainty about counterfactuals (e.g., Manski, 1995) . For mean number of visits and expenditures, the projected ranges are [ 27%, +54%] and [ 23%, +105%], respectively. These results are presented in Table   3 , Column (1).
As seen in Column (2), these ranges narrow dramatically under MTR and MTS. With v = 1, the fraction using any services would rise by no more than 2 percentage points, a 9% increase. The mean number of visits would rise by no more than four-tenths of a visit (a 10% increase), while per capita expenditures would rise by no more than $15, a 15% increase. The lower bounds rise to the status quo utilization rates. As in Section 3.5, we can examine the sensitivity of these results to departures from strict independence. We …rst consider the assumption that error rates do not increase with utilization (equation (10) Second, we examine the e¤ects of varying in Equation (11) while assuming MTR and MTS hold. Appendix Table 2A 
Monotone Instrumental Variables
We next use monotone instrumental variables (MIV) techniques developed by Manski and Pepper (2000) and extended by Kreider and Pepper (2005) to assess how the bounds can be narrowed when combined with monotonicity assumptions linking utilization outcomes and observed covariates such as age or health status. Consider, for example, age and use of health services. The incidence of many health conditions rises with age, and many health conditions are persistent once developed.
These tendencies suggest that the utilization rate among adults under universal coverage would be nondecreasing in age.
Formally, consider the utilization rate at some age, age 0 , above some threshold, age 0 . We set age 0 equal to 30 years of age. The MIV restriction implies the following inequality restriction:
The conditional probabilities in Equation (23) are not identi…ed, but they can be bounded using the methods described above. Let LB(age) and U B(age) be the known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available information on E(U jI ; age); in computing these bounds, 
The MIV bound on expected utilization under universal coverage is obtained using the law of total probability:
E [U (I = 1)] X age 0 U P (age = age 0 )f inf This MIV estimator is consistent but biased in …nite samples. To account for this bias, we employ Kreider and Pepper's (2005) modi…ed MIV estimator that directly estimates and adjusts for …nite-sample bias using Efron and Tibshirani's (1993a) nonparametric bootstrap correction method. Let T n be a consistent analog estimator of some unknown parameter such that the bias of this estimator is b n = E(T n )
. Using the bootstrap distribution of T n , one can estimate this bias as b b = E (T n ) T n , where E ( ) is the expectation operator with respect to the bootstrap distribution. A bootstrap bias-corrected estimator then follows as T c n = T n b b = 2T n E (T n ). In our setting, the …nite bias is simulated from the bootstrap distributions of the estimated Proposition 3 bounds calculated for each MIV group. 27 
MIV Results
MIV results are presented in Table 3 , Columns (6) and (7). We assess the identifying power of the MIV assumption by comparing these columns with Columns (2) and (5) for the case of arbitrary errors and nonincreasing error rates, respectively. In Column (2), identi…cation is achieved through veri…cation and monotonicity assumptions alone. For v = 0:95 in that case, we estimated that the fraction of the nonelderly population using health services would rise no more than 17% above the status quo to 0:240. Under the additional MIV assumption in Column (6), we estimate that this fraction would rise no more than 12% to 0:231. 
Conclusion
Policymakers have long been interested in identifying the consequences of uninsurance for access to health care and the potential impacts of universal coverage (e.g., Institute of Medicine 2003).
Identi…cation of policy outcomes, however, is confounded by both the presence of unobserved counterfactuals and the potential unreliability of self-reported insurance status. To account for these two distinct types of uncertainty, we developed a nonparametric framework that extends the literature on partially identi…ed probability distributions and treatment e¤ects. Using the new analytical results, we can provide tight bounds on the impact of universal health insurance on provider visits and medical expenditures. As part of the paper's contribution, we showed how to partially identify the conditional mean of a random variable for the case that a binary conditioning variable -in our case health insurance -is subject to arbitrary endogenous measurement error.
Our conservative statistical approach provides informative bounds without imposing parametric distributional assumptions. We began by corroborating self-reported insurance status for a nonrandom portion of the MEPS sample using outside information from insurance cards and follow-back interviews with employers, insurance companies, and medical providers. We remained agnostic about true insurance status for the remainder of the sample and illustrated how a variety of veri…cation, monotonicity, and independence assumptions can be combined to shrink identi…cation regions. We also weakened the strict nondi¤erential independence assumption embodied in the classical errors-in-variables framework to allow for the possibility that using health services may inform a patient of her true insurance status.
In July 1996, about 21% of the nonelderly population used inpatient or ambulatory medical services. Under relatively weak nonparametric assumptions, we estimate that this proportion would rise no more than 1:8 percentage points if everyone had insurance. We further estimate that per capita monthly provider visits across the nonelderly population would rise by no more than fourtenths of a visit (a 9% change), with mean expenditures per month rising by no more than 15%.
These results rely on evidence from our constructed validation sample that no more than 5 percent Parametric studies …nd that insurance increases visits among the uninsured 16% 106%, which corresponds to increases among all nonelderly of 3% 20%. The highest estimates exceed our upper bound, but they come from studies comparing people without insurance the entire year to those with private insurance for an entire year. Those results can be expected to be higher due to the generosity of employment-related bene…ts compared with the mix of public and private insurance considered in our study.
Without assumptions on the speci…c pattern of insurance classi…cation errors, we …nd that a very small degree of classi…cation error is su¢ cient to generate uncertainty about the sign -let alone the magnitude -of the status quo gap in use of services between the insured and uninsured under current policies. This represents an important negative result: a high degree of con…dence in the accuracy of the data is not enough, by itself, to be con…dent about conclusions drawn from the data. Conclusions about di¤ering health care patterns across the insured and uninsured, for example, appear to be critically dependent on researchers'auxiliary identifying assumptions.
The methods developed in this paper can be applied to a wide range of topics that involve identi…cation of conditional expectations or treatment e¤ects given uncertainty about the accuracy of the conditioning variable. Our framework, for example, o¤ers an alternative approach to Blau and This approach for identifying v = 0:95 implicitly assumes that the false positive rate among those reporting private insurance can be generalized to the population reporting public insurance.
It also assumes that the false negative rate among those with at least one employed family member can be generalized to the population with no employed family member. Suppose instead that (1) we know nothing about the false positive rate among unveri…ed cases reporting public insurance,
and (2) we know nothing about the false negative rate among unveri…ed cases in which no family member is employed. In this more conservative setting that allows for complete misreporting within these groups, we obtain the value v = 0:74. Under these assumptions, less than 9 percent of the entire sample may be misclassi…ed. 
